国有企业高管薪酬管制有效性的实证研究——来自A股上市公司的证据  

An Empirical Research on the Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Regulation in State-owned Enterprises: Evidence From A-share Listed Companies

作　　者：黄晓红[1] 张昉[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210018 [2]中国农业银行总行,北京100005

出　　处：《上海金融》2012年第5期98-103,119,共6页Shanghai Finance

摘　　要：国有企业高层管理人员薪酬管制的有效性一直是人们热议的话题,本文以2009年A股市场上市公司为样本,分别按照其性质(国有或非国有)以及所处行业的产业结构(竞争市场或寡占市场)进行分类,实证分析了中国国有企业薪酬管制的有效性。本文的研究表明,国企高管薪酬管制对企业绩效存在正向作用,而其效果几乎不受产业结构的影响,这跟我国国有企业受到政府的保护导致行政垄断有关。最后,本文针对我国国企薪酬改革中存在的问题,提出建议:短期内维持薪酬管制,而将长期目标设定为充分发挥市场机制,完善激励制度,最大限度保证国有企业健康稳定成长。The effectiveness of executive compensation regulation in SOE(state-owned enterprise) has always been a hot topic of discussion.Taking the A-share listed companies of 2009 as samples and classifying them on the nature(state-owned or non-state-owned) and the industrial structure(competitive market or oligopoly market),the paper analyzes empirically the effectiveness of executive compensation regulation in China's SOE.The result shows that such compensation has positive effects on the performance of enterprises,but it is hardly affected by the industrial structure.This can be explained by the administrative monopoly caused by the governmental protection towards the SOE.As conclusion,the article puts forward suggestions aiming to solve the existing problems in the current China's executive compensation reform: that compensation regulation should be remained in the short term while the long-term objectives should focus on the perfection of the incentives amid market mechanism so as to maximize the healthy and stable growth of the SOE.

关 键 词：薪酬管制 产业结构 国有企业 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]