基于激励机制的P2P节点安全性研究  

Research on the Securty of P2P Peer Based on Incentive Mechanism

作　　者：席菁[1] 陈博[1] 余艳玮[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学软件学院,江苏苏州215123

出　　处：《小型微型计算机系统》2012年第6期1242-1245,共4页Journal of Chinese Computer Systems

摘　　要：P2P网络中的节点信任问题是阻碍P2P发展的难题之一,在分析现有信任模型的基础上,提出一种引入不确定性因素的信任模型,用BGTR判定树进行连接,同时在此基础上给出了一种基于纳什均衡的激励模型,通过贡献值的计算来抵御恶意节点的攻击.实验结果表明,此模型在抵御虚假节点以及提高交易次数及交易质量方面都有一定的成效.the trust of P2P peers is the one problem to hinder the development of P2P development,based on analysis the existing trust models,this paper proposes a trust model pulled into nondeterminism,and use the BGTR tree to link four parts of this trust model,at the same time,proposes a incentive mechanism with nash balanced to resist the attack method of unture peers which accumulate the contribution value.the experiments indicate this model has effect on withstand untrue peers and increase transaction counts and quality.

关 键 词：P2P 信任模型 激励机制 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]