基于必有组件独占的双边市场协调——以数字电视产业为例  

Coordination of Two-sided Market Based on Must-have Component Exclusivity——A Case Study on DTV Industry

作　　者：顾永红[1] 万兴[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学集团经济与产业组织研究中心,江苏南京210096 [2]南京财经大学产业发展研究院,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《西安电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期72-79,共8页Journal of Xidian University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71103079);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71173036);江苏省社会科学基金项目(10EYC021);江苏省教育厅哲社项目(2010SJB790013)

摘　　要：数字电视产业服务于广告客户和电视观众,是典型的双边市场。文章分析双边市场协调如何影响数字电视频道商和传输运营商的共同利润。基于当前数字电视的市场结构,即电视频道商决定广告价格,而终端收视价格由传输运营商决定,文章建立了一个三阶段的博弈模型发现,对某个电视频道商的内容收取较低的终端收视价格会损害其它电视频道利益,因此传输运营商控制终端收视价格只能部分内化数字电视频道之间的竞争。研究结论表明,只有开放网络才能够解决双边市场中存在的双边问题。The TV industry is a typical two-sided market serving both advertisers and viewers. The purpose of this article is to analyze how coordination of the two-sided market affects the outcome of joint profits between the DTV channels and the distributor. Based on the current market structure that advertising prices are set by DTV channels while end-viewer prices are set by distributor, we establish a three-stage game model and find that a lower end-viewer price at one DTV channel will harm rival DTV channel, and that the distributor therefore partly internalize the competition between the DTV channels. The paper concludes that the two-sidedness of the two-sided market can be solved by the network.

关 键 词：双边市场 协调 必有组件独占 数字电视产业 

分 类 号：F723[经济管理—市场营销]