内部人控制、审计监督与管理者利益侵占  

Internal Control,Internal Audit and Manager Expropriation

作　　者：赵国宇[1] 唐红[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东商学院会计学院,广东广州510320 [2]湖南财政经济学院会计系,湖南长沙410205

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2012年第4期47-54,共8页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70372040);湖南省软科学项目(2008ZK3095);广东商学院校级科研资助项目(10BS79002)

摘　　要：股东、经理和内部审计师利益博弈的结果表明:经理的控制权越大,侵占股东利益的可能性越大;公司的内部审计监督越严,经理侵占股东利益的可能性越小。实证研究为此提供了经验证据:若总经理兼任董事长,经理人员在董事会中所占比例越高,越易造成经理层控制董事会的局面,管理层侵占股东利益就越严重;内部审计监督越强,越有利于抑制管理层的利益侵占行为。国有企业由于内部人控制现象更为突出,监督不力,管理者对股东的利益侵占更加严重。This paper studies the relations of internal control, audit failure and the manager expropriation by methods of game analysis and empirical testing. Game analysis shows that the more power of internal control the managers have, the more possi- bility to invade the interests of shareholders. The more stringent the company＇s internal audit and supervision is, the less possi- bility of invasion of the interests of shareholders. If a person is the company＇s general and chairman of the board, the higher the number of managers in the board is, the easier to cause the situation for the managers to control the board of directors, so the more serious the manager expropriation of the interests of shareholders. If internal audit supervision is stronger, then it is more conducive to curb the management expropriation behavior. If state-owned company internal control is more outstanding, so manager expropriation of the interests of shareholders is more serious.

关 键 词：内部人控制 内部审计 管理者利益侵占 审计监督 舞弊 

分 类 号：F239.45[经济管理—会计学]