风险投资双层委托代理的报酬契约与代理成本分析  

Reward contract and agency costs on venture capital's double principal-agent

作　　者：张新立[1] 姜明佐[1] 杨玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁师范大学数学学院,辽宁大连116029

出　　处：《辽宁师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2012年第2期154-158,共5页Journal of Liaoning Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学项目(10YJC630395;09YJC630213)

摘　　要：风险投资者、风险投资家和风险企业家之间存在严重的信息非对称性,使得风险投资运行过程中的代理问题异常严重.如何通过设计机制形成对风险投资的激励约束就成为风险投资是否成功的关键.利用博弈论相关理论,从投资者设计激励契约的角度出发,建立了一个双层委托代理博弈模型,分析了影响风险投资家和企业家激励强度的相关因素,探讨了实施激励契约的总代理成本,为投资者设计有效的激励契约提供了一定的理论依据.The agency problem is highlighted in the process of venture capital due to serious asymmetric information among venture investor,venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur.How to design mechanism to form incentive compatible constraints is a crucial issue for succeeding in venture capital or not.By using game theory,a double principal-agent game model is set up from venture investor designing an incentive contract.Firstly,the model analyzes some factors of influencing intensity of incentive for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur.Then,the model discusses the total agent costs of implementing the incentive contract.Thus we provide,some academic gists for venture investor to design an incentive contract.

关 键 词：风险投资 双层委托代理 报酬契约 代理成本 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]