现金股利是“掏空”的工具还是掩饰“掏空”的面具?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Is Cash Dividend Policy a Tool for Tunneling or Masking Expropriations?——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：肖作平[1] 苏忠秦[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2012年第2期77-84,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002062);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0666);教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(09XJC630013);教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(200806131003)

摘　　要：本文利用我国2004～2008年上市公司平衡面板数据检验终极控制股东与现金股利之间的关系。研究发现,在其他条件相同的情况下,现金流量权与现金股利支付水平显著负相关;控制权和现金流量权分离度与现金股利支付水平显著正相关。这表明终极控制股东并不是把现金股利作为"掏空"的工具,而是把现金股利作为掩饰"掏空"的面具。Corporate governance is a very popular research area because it affects many different corporate decisions and behaviors. The research area covers various topics and we are interested in studying the ultimate ownership structure. The separation of control right and cash flow right empowers ultimate shareholders to expropriate corporate wealth by providing them both incentives and tools. The separation of control right from cash flow right is very common because pyramidal and cross-holding ownership structures are typical in China. Empirical evidence on the ultimate ownership structure shows both positive and negative effects on cash dividends. Given the mixed evidence, further research on this issue is warranted.

关 键 词：终极所有权结构 现金流量权与控制权的分离度 现金股利 掠夺 

分 类 号：F276.16[经济管理—企业管理]