“官员型”高管、公司业绩和非生产性支出——基于国有上市公司的经验证据  

Administrative Experienced Executives,Corporate Performance and Nonproductive Expenditures:an Empirical Evidence from Listed State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：逯东[1] 林高[1] 黄莉[1] 杨丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学,四川成都611130

出　　处：《金融研究》2012年第6期139-153,共15页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71103147);国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71072167)资助

摘　　要：本文考察了国有上市公司的最高管理层——董事长和总经理,其过去是否具有官员经历对公司经营的影响。研究发现:(1)"官员型"高管会损害公司业绩;(2)基于组织任命约束下的政治目标和个人利益追求,"官员型"高管会把更多的资源配置在非生产性活动上,给企业带来更多的非生产性支出,产生了更大的政治成本和代理成本。本文的经验证据表明,政府干预下的人事控制扭曲了正常的企业高管激励机制,损害了资源的配置效率。This paper explored that the chairman of director board and the CEO in the SOEs can affect the enter- prise significantly, whether their former administrative experience will affect the performance of the company. We find firstly the administrative experienced executives do harm the corporate performance; secondly the ad- ministrative experienced executives put more resources into nonproductive activities, which bring more nonpro- ductive expenditures, results in more political costs and agency costs. The empirical evidences in the paper shows that the personnel control intervened by the government twists the regular top executives motivation mech- anism, and it do harms the allocation efficiency of resources.

关 键 词：“官员型”高管 非生产性支出 政府干预 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224