做错事的权利  

A Right to Do Wrong

作　　者：J.沃尔德伦 朱万润[2] 

机构地区：[1]美国纽约大学法学院 [2]吉林大学行政学院

出　　处：《世界哲学》2012年第4期45-61,共17页World Philosophy

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目"促进社会公平正义与政府治理研究"(10ZD&040);吉林大学科学前沿与交叉学科创新项目"正义与权利:道德权利的契约论证明"的阶段成果

摘　　要：做错事的权利这一概念初看似乎是一个悖论。本文在排除了各种似是而非的解决方案之后,立足于道德权利的一般性概念对做错事的权利给出了论证。作者认为,道德对行为的评价大体上可分为三类:正确且可被允许的行为、错误且应受批评的行为以及与道德无关的行为。如果排除错误的行为,最终将会使道德权利变得贫乏,从而丧失保护个人选择这一重要功能。而且,做错事的权利也不涉及任何逻辑上的不一致。'A right to do wrong' seems to be an oxymoron term.After excluding several specious solutions,the author offered a justification based on the concept of the generality of rights.Normally,disputes upon rights happen on the level of general rights rather than specific rights;and under the domain of a general right,the right-bearer could choose a wide range of actions.From the moral point of view,actions could be either morally right and required,morally wrong and criticized or morally indifference.If morally wrong actions are to be excluded from moral rights,the language of moral rights would be impoverished,and thus lost the essential function of protecting individual choices.And the right to do wrong does not involve any logical incoherence.

关 键 词：道德权利 行为 正确 错误 

分 类 号：B712.5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]