关于上市公司股权激励效应的实证研究  

An Empirical Study on the Effect of Equity Incentive in Listed Companies

作　　者：刘佑铭[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期109-114,164,共6页Journal of South China Normal University：Social Science Edition

摘　　要：以2006-2009年推出股权激励方案的上市公司为样本,对股权激励与公司业绩之间的关系进行实证分析得出如下结论:股权激励制度有助于减少上市公司管理者的超额消费、过度投资以及闲置资金等利益侵占行为;实施股权激励方案后,上市公司绩效平均值有一定程度上升;我国上市公司股权激励实践的结果符合"利益汇聚假说"理论,管理者通过股权激励而持股比例上升,上市公司绩效也随之提高;我国上市公司股权激励比例与公司绩效之间不存在曲线关系。When the listed companies rolling out equity incentive scheme from 2006 to 2009 are chosen as sample,the empirical analysis on the relationship between equity incentive and the performance of the companies shows:equity incentive system can help to reduce benefit expropriations such as excessive consumption of managers in these listed companies,excessive investment,and idle fund.After implementing equity incentive schemes,average performance of the listed companies rises to a certain extent.The practice of equity incentive in our listed companies complies with 'interest converge hypothesis'.With increase of shareholding ratio in managers under equity incentive scheme,performance of the listed companies rises.Curve relationship doesn't exist between the proportion of equity incentive and performance of the listed companies in our country.

关 键 词：上市公司 股权激励 代理成本 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]