罗尔斯的公平正义观真的反对后果主义吗?  

Is Rawls' Conception of Justice as Fairness really Against Consequentialism?

作　　者：葛四友[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学研究》2012年第7期91-99,129,共9页Philosophical Research

摘　　要：罗尔斯在《正义论》中所提出的公平正义观对当代政治哲学产生了极大的影响,连其理论的主要反对者诺齐克都说：＂《正义论》是自约翰.斯图尔特.密尔的著作以来所仅见的一部有力的、深刻的、精巧的、论述宽广和系统的政治和道德哲学著作……政治哲学家们现在必须要么在罗尔斯的框架内工作,要么解释不这么做的原因。＂（诺齐克,1990年,第187页）罗尔斯在《正义论》中提出：＂我的目的是确定一个能够代替一般的功利主义、从而也能代替它的各种变化形式的作为一种选择对象的正义论。＂（罗尔斯,2009年,第18页。下引罗尔斯文献仅注年份和页码）他在书中采用的是反思平衡的证成方法：这种方法是反基础主义的，即我们无法从真的或客观有效的道德前提来推出结论；不管是道德前提、推理还是最后的结论，都要求具有直观合理性，并且在E此之间是相互支持和融贯的。罗尔斯的公平正义理论也相应地在这些方面都表现为反对后果主义，支持义务论。Rawls' conception of justice as fairness has had a great influence on recent political philosophy and is generally believed to be against consequentialism.However,this belief is based on multiple confusions.As far as moral intuitions are concerned,justice as fairness conflates not only the principles of justice with administration of justice but also impartiality with luck egalitarianism.Justice as fairness' reasoning confuses the normative usage of benevolence with its descriptive usage and the motive argument against consequentialism actually begs the question.The conclusion of justice as fairness doesn't distinguish the instrumental value of freedom and its intrinsic value and then the absolute priorities among principles of justice are not tenable.We can explain its relative priorities by consequentialism.Then,it is shown by these clarifications that justice as fairness is not really against consequentialism but a development of it.

关 键 词：公平正义理论 后果主义 罗尔斯 正义观 《正义论》 政治哲学家 哲学著作 2009年 

分 类 号：B505[哲学宗教—外国哲学]