考虑相互信息监督下的服务合作生产契约  

Contracting for Collaborative Services Considering Inter-organizational Information Monitoring

作　　者：李慧芬[1] 杨德礼[1] 王建军[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2012年第3期206-211,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助重大项目(70890080;70890083);国家自然科学基金资助青年项目(70902033)

摘　　要：知识密集型服务合作生产由于存在相互之间的知识依赖和信息粘性,双方信息管理效率影响合作激励机制的设计。从相互信息监督视角出发,综合考虑双方信息监督效率和相对重要性参数对服务合作生产契约设计的影响。结果表明,在双方信息监督效率相同情况下,相对更重要的一方拥有剩余激励是最优的;在双方信息监督效率不同时,让监督更有效且相对更重要的一方拥有剩余激励是最优的;如果监督效率优势和相对重要性优势没有集中于一方,则结果取决于两者的比较,具有更强优势的一方应该成为剩余激励索取者。双方的相对重要性和信息监督效率共同决定合作契约。The coproduction and delivery process of knowledge-intensive services across client and provider organizations has costly information stickness because of their knowledge interdependence, and it would result in implications for collaborative service contracting. From an inter-organizational information management perspective, we develop models to study the implications from both their information monitoring efficiency and their relativet importance parameters. We find that, with an equal information monitoring efficiency, the more important party＇ should own the residual right; when their monitoring efficiency is not the same, the party who has both efficiency advantage and importance advantage should be the owner of the residual incentives; if the advantages do not belong to one party, the choice of the collaborative contract would be contingent on the trade-offs of the two comparative advantages. Relative importance and information monitoring efficiency jointly determine the participants＇ incentives.

关 键 词：博弈论 信息监督 委托代理模型 服务合作契约 

分 类 号：F276.42[经济管理—企业管理]