God, Intensional Negation, and the Devil（s）  

作　　者：Jari Palom~iki 

机构地区：[1]University of Tampere

出　　处：《Journal of Philosophy Study》2012年第5期323-336,共14页哲学研究（英文版）

摘　　要：In this paper an intensional concept theory based on an intensional containment relation is presented, which, in turn, is then generalized in order to define the complete concept of God. We are following Leibniz＇s definition of God as a most perfect Being, by which he meant a subject of all perfections. As a consequence of this definition of God, two different complete concepts of the Devil（s） can be defined. However, these two complete concepts of the Devil（s） are not only incoherent with Leibniz＇s philosophy, but they introduce the problem of the Devil（s） as well, which seems to originate from a problem of an adequate definition of the concept of God on one hand, and the logical problem of the intensional negation of a concept on the other hand.

关 键 词：intensional logic concept theory NEGATION LEIBNIZ GOD Devils 

分 类 号：O172[理学—数学] O174.52[理学—基础数学]