管理者代理行为、公司过度投资与公司治理——基于企业生命周期视角的实证研究  

Managerial Agency Behavior,Corporate Over-investment and Corporate Governance: Empirical Study from the Perspective of Corporate Lifecycle

作　　者：李云鹤[1] 李湛[2] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学金融与统计学院国际金融与风险管理研究中心,上海200241 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《管理评论》2012年第7期117-131,共15页Management Review

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划青年项目(2012EJB003)

摘　　要：通过建立企业生命周期新的划分指标,从企业发展的动态层面研究管理者代理行为与公司过度投资之间关系随企业生命周期的演变,并检验公司治理机制随企业生命周期的治理效果。结果表明,我国上市公司管理者代理行为随企业生命周期动态变化,其对公司过度投资的影响随企业生命周期发展不断减弱。不同公司治理机制的治理效果随企业生命周期也发生变化,其中董事长总经理兼任在成长阶段能够有效抑制公司过度投资,而独立董事在成熟阶段及大股东在衰退阶段均显著没有发挥应有的监督作用。成长阶段中的公司监事会能够对代理行为引致的过度投资起到显著的监督作用,而董事长总经理兼任则显著加剧代理行为引致的过度投资,成长阶段中管理层持股、成熟阶段中独立董事与外部机构持股以及衰退阶段中大股东均显著没有起到应有的治理作用。This paper breaks out the traditional methods and makes a research on over-investment from the dynamic perspective by designing a new index of corporate lifecycle. Moreover, it examines the effectiveness of corporate governance with corporate lifecycle. The findings indicate that managerial agency evolves along corporate lifecycle, and its effects on the degree of over-investment decrease with the development from growing stage to declining stage. Besides, the corporate governance factors are also changing along corporate lifecycle. Board duality, for instance, could effectively weaken corporate over-investment, while board independence at the stage of maturity and large stock holders at the stage of decline fail to effectively play their respective monitor role. Supervisory board at the stage of growth could not effectively monitor corporate over-investment induced by managerial agency, while board duality exaggerates corporate over-investment, but stock holding by management at the stage of growth, board independence and stock holding by external institutions at the stage of maturity and large stock holders fail to play their role in governing corporate over-investment.

关 键 词：公司过度投资 管理者代理行为 公司治理 企业生命周期 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济] F224