治理结构与信息披露违规行为——来自我国A股上市公司的经验证据  

Governance Structure and Illegal Actions of Information Disclosure-Evidence from China's A Share Listed Companies

作　　者：于晓强[1] 刘善存[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100191

出　　处：《系统工程》2012年第6期43-52,共10页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071010)

摘　　要：以1998～2007年因为信息披露违规行为被监管层处理的262家A股上市公司及其262家配对公司为研究对象,实证分析了治理结构与信息披露违规行为的关系。结果表明:上市公司所在地的市场化程度越高、政府干预程度越低、法制及中介发育水平越高,信息披露违规概率越小;第一大股东持股比例越高、机构持股比例越高、股权集中度越高的上市公司,其信息披露违规概率越小;管理费用比率越低、年度股东大会出席率越高、持有公司股票董事越多的上市公司,其信息披露违规概率越小。Using panel data of 262 A-share listed companies which first received enforcement actions from the regulators in China due to committing fraud spanning from 1998 to 2007 and the corresponding 262 firms which were arranged in pairs with the ,former firms, this paper investigates the relationship between governance structure and illegal actions of information disclosure. It has reached the major conclusions as follows. The more developed the market, legal institutions and intermediary organizations, the less frequent the government intervention, the less probability companies commit fraud with. Companies in which the proportions of shares hold by the first big shareholder or institutional investors are larger and the ownership concentration is much more are less likely to commit fraud. The listed companies with less overhead expenses, higher attendance rate of the Annual General Meeting and more directors who hold stocks are less likely to commit fraud.

关 键 词：治理结构 信息披露 违规行为 市场化水平 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]