基于基金经理更换的激励约束效应研究  

Study on Stimulation-and-Constraints Effect of Fund Managers Replacement Mechanism

作　　者：彭文平[1] 肖继辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经管学院,广东广州510631 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《上海金融》2012年第8期70-79,118,共10页Shanghai Finance

基　　金：作者主持的国家自科基金项目"基金行业锦标赛与基金经理激励约束效应研究"(71002087);教育部人文社科项目"开放式基金经理能力成长与激励机制研究"(08JC63030);广东省人文社科基地重点项目"基金家庭利益输送与投资者公平待遇研究"(09JDXM79010)阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文以2005年至2009年为样本期,考察了基金业绩和内部治理机制在基金经理更换中的作用,以及更换后业绩和投资行为的变化。研究发现:业绩能够较好解释基金经理降职,但对升职解释不足。基金经理升职后,继任经理会改变投资风格,从而使得业绩能够保持;而降职之后,继任经理的投资风格和资产配置都发生了显著的变化,从而使得基金业绩在不增加投资组合风险的前提下得以改善。股权较为分散、股东间有效制衡的基金公司旗下的基金经理更容易被更换,但董事会制度与基金经理更换不尽相关。同时中资基金经理更换机制不如合资基金有效。所以,基金经理更换是一种较为有效但尚不完善的激励机制。Taking samples from 2005 to 2009,the thesis makes a review on the roles played by fund performance and internal governance mechanisms in the replacement of fund managers and its consequences on performance and investment behaviors.It is found that the performance gives good accounts for the demotion of fund managers but has no significant influence on their promotion.After the managers' promotion,their successors would change investment styles to maintain the performance.In the case of demotion,the successors will make significant changes in terms of investment styles and asset allocation to improve fund performance without increasing portfolio risk.Those fund managers are more likely to be replaced who are from the fund companies with separated shareholdings yet effective checks and balances among shareholders.However,replacement of fund managers is not related to the board system while it is less effective to change managers in Chinese-invested fund companies than that in joint-ventured ones.Therefore,there is still room for the replacement mechanism to perfect.

关 键 词：基金经理更换 基金治理 激励机制 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]