基于演化博弈的区域高耗能产业退出机制研究  

Study of Regional Energy-Intensive Industry's Exit Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：郭本海[1,2] 方志耕[1] 刘卿[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]安徽工业大学管理学院,安徽马鞍山243002

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2012年第4期79-85,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然基金资助项目(71173106);国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(10ZD&014);江苏省社会科学基多项目(10EYB009)

摘　　要：高耗能产业的退出是通过产业结构调整提高区域经济系统能效的基本途径,高耗能产业的退出是一个基于地方政府与相关企业间的演化博弈过程。本文运用演化博弈的基本原理,构建了区域高耗能产业退出机制,着重分析了影响各方博弈主体策略选择的因素,构建了不同策略下参与主体双方的支付函数,并建立相应的复制动态方程,寻求演化稳定策略。The exit of energy-intensive industry is a kind of basic approach improving the energy efficiency of the regional economic system through industrial restructuring.It is the process of evolutionary game based on local government and related enterprises.In this paper,based on the basic principle of evolutionary game,the regional energy-intensive industry＇s exit mechanism is built,typically the factors affecting strategy selection of each game subject are analyzed,the payment function of the main parties involved under different strategies is proposed,the corresponding replicator dynamic equation is established,and evolutionary stable strategy is disussed.

关 键 词：演化博弈 复制动态方程 演化稳定策略 高耗能产业 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]