地方政府竞争、企业上市方式与政企间利益输送——来自中国家族企业上市公司的经验证据  

Local Government Competition,Corporate Listing Approaches,Interest Transfer between Governments and Firms:Evidence from Family Listed Companies in China

作　　者：黎文靖[1] 程敏英[2] 黄琼宇[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第9期27-36,47,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802024);教育部人文社科研究规划基金项目(10YJA790127)

摘　　要：中国转轨经济下的财政分权体制和政治晋升锦标赛激励地方政府官员将政策资源向有利于自身政绩的方向倾斜。文章研究发现,与买壳上市家族企业相比,直接上市家族企业获得了更多的银行贷款、政府补贴和税收优惠,但同时通过更高的资产回报、过度投资和负担更多的超额雇员服务于地方经济和社会目标。文章分析了地方政府热衷于推动新企业上市并给予大量政策扶持的原因,对于市场化进程中制定相关政策指导地方政府行为具有重要参考价值。In transitional China, fiscal decentralization system and politicalpromotion tournaments encourage local officials to allocatepolicy-related resources in favor of their administrative achievements. This paper concludes that, compared to family firms that went public via takeover, family firms that went public via IPO gain more bank loans, government subsidies and tax preference, but serve local economic and social objectives through higher return on assets, over-investment and heavier burden on employment. It analyzes why local governments are keen about promoting listing of new firms and giving much policy support, providing important references for policy formulation aiming to guide the behavior of local officials in the process of marketization.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 家族企业 上市方式 政企间利益输送 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学] F272