谁在择机IPO:上市公司控股股东视角的实证分析  被引量:2

Who Chooses the IPO Market Timing? Empirical Analysis from the Perspective of Controlling Shareholders in Listed Companies

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作  者:刘志远[1] 王勇[1,2] 靳光辉[1] 

机构地区:[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]中国石油大学(华东)经济管理学院,山东青岛266555

出  处:《财经研究》2012年第9期69-80,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基  金:国家自然科学基金"制度环境;投资者情绪与企业投资行为"(71072099)

摘  要:文章基于控股股东的视角,以市场层面的投资者情绪作为IPO择机窗口,实证研究发现,高代理成本控股股东更倾向择机IPO,相比国有控股股东,代理成本特征差异对非国有控股股东IPO择机倾向的影响较弱。这表明代理成本高低对控股股东IPO择机倾向的影响受到制度层面的国有性质因素的制约。2005年IPO询价制度的实施的政策影响研究表明,询价制度的实施弱化了代理成本特征差异对控股股东IPO择机倾向的影响,为监管政策变更影响公司融资行为提供了新兴加转轨市场独特的经验证据。From the perspective of controlling shareholders, this paper regards market-level investor sentiment as a substitution variable of IPO market timing window and makes an empirical study which indicates that controlling shareholders in companies with high agency costs are more apt to choose the IPO market timing and compared to state-owned controlling shareholders, the characteristic differences of agency costs have weaker effects on the tendency of non-state-owned controlling shareholders to choose IPO market timing, showing that the effect of agency costs on the tendency of controlling shareholders to choose IPO market timing is influ- enced by state-owned institutional factor. The study of the policy effect of IPO inquiry system implemented in 2005 shows that the implementation of inquiry system weakens the effect of characteristic differences of agency costs on the tendency of controlling shareholders to choose IPO market tim ing, which provides unique empirical evidence for the effect of changes in supervision policies on corporate financing behavior in emerging and transitional markets.

关 键 词:控股股东 代理成本 IPO择机 询价制度 

分 类 号:F275[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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