行政契约理论在反垄断承诺制度中的展开  

Research on Anti-Monopoly Commitment Mechanism by Introducing Administrative Contract Theory

作　　者：许延东[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学,重庆201120

出　　处：《重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第4期30-33,共4页Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：2010年度中国法学会部级法学研究课题"技术标准化的反垄断法规制研究"(编号:CLS-D1067)成果

摘　　要：我国《反垄断法》第45条规定的经营者承诺制度的实质是行政和解。鉴于目前经营者承诺制度立法及理论的不成熟,有必要借鉴行政契约理念及行政和解理论展开对反垄断执法承诺制度的重新诠释,使反垄断和解制度获得理念和原理的支撑,并回应反垄断执法和解制度的正当性危机,弥补执法程序规则阙失之不足,规范反垄断执法中公权力的行使,从而厘清其制度逻辑,彰显其制度禀赋,重塑其制度价值。According to article 45 of Anti-monopoly Law of People＇s Republic of China, the ＂undertaking commitment＂ is a dispute resolution mechanism which legally binds the undertaking concerned to the commitment it has offered. As this mechanism may end the Bureau＇s investigation, it is essentially a certain kind of administrative reconciliation. Since ＂undertaking commitment＂ still has deficiencies in both legislation practice and theory construction in China, it is necessary to look back for the basic theory of administrative contract and administrative reconciliation. These basic principles and ideas can provide support for anti-monopoly reconciliation mechanism, challenge the doubts of legitimacy, make up for the deficiency in procedure and regulate the execution of public power in order to help us clarify its logic, find out its advantages and rebuild its value.

关 键 词：反垄断法执法和解 经营者承诺 行政契约 行政和解 

分 类 号：D912.294[政治法律—民商法学]