风险资本能改善风险投资企业治理效率吗?——一个盈余管理视角  

Can Venture Capital Improve the Governance Efficiency of the Portfolio Company? A Earnings Management Perspective

作　　者：耿建新[1] 张驰[1] 刘凤元[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872 [2]华东政法大学国际金融法律学院,上海200040

出　　处：《经济问题》2012年第9期74-78,共5页On Economic Problems

摘　　要：从风险资本积极投资者的角度研究了风险资本投资企业的公司治理结构对风险投资企业创业板上市时盈余管理的影响。实证结果表明,风险投资企业公司治理结构中仅有董事会规模对公司盈余管理有抑制作用;独立董事比例、风险资本董事比例、监事会规模和外部监事比例对公司盈余管理都没有显著影响。同时,董事会、监事会持股比例,CEO持股比例对公司上市时盈余管理也没有显著影响。创业板上市风险投资企业的盈余管理程度主要受公司规模、财务杠杆比例以及公司行业特征影响。We study the governance of the portfolio company invested by the venture capital how to work in the earnings management of the portfolio company. Through the empirical analysis for the listing companies in the second hoard in the Shenzhen, we find that only the size of the hoard affects the earnings management of the portfolio company. However, the proportion of the independent director in the hoard, the proportion of the venture capital director in the board, the size of the board of supervisors , the proportion of the out supervisor don＇ t affect the earnings management. The earnings management of the portfolio companies mainly is affected by the scale, the leverage and the industry of the portfolio companies.

关 键 词：风险投资企业 创业板 公司治理 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]