基于固定工资和声誉的国企经理行为动态分析  

An Analysis on Dynamics of Managers' Behavior of State-Owned Enterprises with Fixed Wages and Reputation

作　　者：孔峰[1] 张微[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学经济管理学院,河北保定071003

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2012年第5期716-720,共5页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJA630034)

摘　　要：一般文献的研究认为固定工资无激励效果,但经研究发现,在我国国有企业中,经理人的固定工资也有很强的激励效果。由于国有企业的经理人是通过上级政府行政任命的,上级政府对经理具有很强的约束作用,并且被任命为国有企业的经理人会给其带来很高的效用,即在职消费以及相应的特权。所以,我国国有企业经理人都有较强的声誉考虑。基于这种声誉前提,为了更好地建立经理努力与企业业绩关系的模型,突破传统模型将经理的经营行为分为长期努力、短期行为和普通经营努力,并分别建立了国有企业静态和动态激励模型,分析了固定工资报酬形式下,国有企业经理的行为选择特征,得出了固定工资是如何实现其激励效果的。In the literature, it is considered that fixed wages has no incentive effects. However, this study finds that managers of state-owned enterprises in China also have incentive effects under the fixed wages. The reason is that the state-owned enterprises ＇ managers are employed through administrative appointments by higher authorities. This makes the government has a strong constraint on the managers. Once they are appointed as managers of state-owned enterprises, the job consumption and the corresponding privileges will highly compensate them. Managers of state-owned enterprises are strongly concerned with their reputations. As a premise of reputation, in order to better establish the relationship between effort and enterprise performance, we divide the managers~ business activities into long term effort, short-term behavior and general management effort and establish static and dynamic incentive models. We analyze the characteristics of behavior choices of the state-owned enterprise managers, and show the incentive effect of fixed wages.

关 键 词：国有企业 固定工资 声誉 经理行为 动态模型 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]