股权激励与投资行为:以光明乳业为例  

Equity Incentives and Investment Behavior:A Case Study of Bright Dairy

作　　者：李侠[1] 沈小燕[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学会计与财务研究院,江苏南京210093 [2]南通大学商学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《上海立信会计学院学报》2012年第4期34-44,共11页Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目(11YJC630176);国家自然科学基金项目(71072042)

摘　　要：投资决策是决定公司价值创造的重要因素之一,作为公司价值和经济增长的源泉,必然也受到管理层动机的影响。由所有权和经营权分离所导致的代理问题会影响高管人员的投资决策,导致公司过度投资或投资不足。由于投资对经理人兼具私人收益与私人成本,股权激励作为解决代理问题的一种长期激励方式,可能改变上述成本与收益的对比,其设计、实施是否合理会直接影响高管人员的行为,进而影响公司的投资行为。本文以光明乳业为例,分析股权激励如何影响国有上市公司的投资行为,并给出对策性建议。Investment decisions are important determinants of a company＇s value creation. As the source of a company＇s value and economic growth, investment decisions are bound to be influenced by managers＇ motivation. Agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and management will affect managers＇ investment decisions, and lead to over-investment or inadequate investment. As investment has both private benefit and cost for managers, equity incentive may change the comparison of cost and benefit since it is a long-term incentive to solve agency problems. The reasonableness of these incentives＇ design and implement will influence managers＇ behavior directly and thereby affect the company＇s investment behavior. Taking the Bright Dairy as an example, we analyze how equity incentive will affect the investment behavior of state-owned listed companies. Some suggestions are given accordingly at last.

关 键 词：股权激励 国有企业 投资行为 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]