股票发行市场参与主体最优行为模式与法律监管  

The Optimal Behavior of Participant and Legal Supervision in Stock Issuance Market

作　　者：尹海员[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学国际商学院,陕西西安710062

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2012年第5期78-89,共12页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(11SZYB45);教育部人文社会科学青年基金(06JC790027)

摘　　要：通过分析股票发行市场中,在发行人和中介人向投资者提供股票和推荐服务的情况下各主体的最优行为均衡解及法律如何确定最优监管强度,结果显示,在信息不对称的情况下,如果没有法律的约束,发行人和中介人对投资者提供的股票质量和推荐服务都极其低下。但法律监管在规范市场行为的同时,又会造成发行人和中介人相互有搭便车的动机,随着客户甄别难度的增加,双方的努力程度都有下降的趋势;在可变佣金制度下,中介人有动机在向投资者提供推荐服务时降低推荐质量。This paper analyzes the issue of the optimal behavior of participant and legal supervision in stock market under conditions of stock issuer and intermediaries providing products and services to investors. In the case of asymmetric information, if there is no legal constraint, the issuer and the intermediaries will provide low quality stocks and referral services. But legal regulation improves not only market welfare but also the mutual hitchhike motivation between the issuer and intermediaries. In addition, with the difficulty of screening client increasing, the level of effort of intermediaries has a downward trend. On the condition of variable commission system, intermediaries also have motivation to reduee the quality of recommendation to investors.

关 键 词：股票发行市场 法律监管 投资者保护 最优行为 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]