地方物流供应商专用性设施建设激励机制研究  

The Incentive Mechanism for Civilian Logistics Suppliers' Constructing Specific Logistics Facilities

作　　者：姚平[1] 姜大立[1] 姜玉宏[1] 刘军[1] 

机构地区：[1]后勤工程学院后勤信息工程系,重庆401311

出　　处：《后勤工程学院学报》2012年第5期66-71,共6页Journal of Logistical Engineering University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871119/G0109);国家社会科学基金资助项目(09CJY012)

摘　　要：军民融合现代军事物流体系中地方物流供应商进行专用性物流设施建设时,常因机会主义行为和合约的不完备性而引发"套牢"问题,进而导致投资不足和物流保障质量下降。从专用性物流设施建设"套牢"问题概念分析入手,剖析"套牢"原因,基于不完全关系契约建立专用性物流设施建设激励机制,并推导证明了该机制能激励地方物流供应商最大程度地进行专用性物流设施投资建设。In modern military logistics system of civilian-military integration, the ＂holding-up＂ problem can be caused when the civilian logistics suppliers invest in the specific logistics facilities with opportunistic behavior and contract＇ incompleteness, which can lead to lack of investment and fall of logistics guarantee quality. This paper analyzes the concept of ＂holding-up＂ in the area of specific logistics facilities construction and its reason, then establishes incentive mechanism for specific logistics facilities construction on the basis of the incomplete contractual relationship, and proofs that the incentive mechanism can bestir civilian logistics suppliers to invest in the specific logistics facilities to the best of one＇ s abilities.

关 键 词：地方物流供应商 专用性物流设施 激励机制 套牢 

分 类 号：F062.3[经济管理—政治经济学]