非效率定价、管理层股权激励与公司股票股利  

Inefficient Pricing,Managerial Stock Incentives and Stock Dividends

作　　者：韩慧博[1] 吕长江[2] 李然[3] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心,北京100027 [2]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [3]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100027

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第10期47-56,100,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71002004);国家社会科学基金重点项目(10AZD014);对外经济贸易大学学术创新团队和对外经济贸易大学"211"工程三期建设项目的资助

摘　　要：文章使用2006-2010年中国上市公司股权激励的数据,检验股权激励方案的实施如何影响公司的股票股利行为。在检验股票股利长期市场反应的基础上,文章发现,实施股权激励的公司更倾向于发放高额股票股利,且股权激励的程度越高,发放高额股票股利的可能性也越大。进一步研究还发现,不同类型的股权激励制度对股票股利政策的影响也有所不同。文章结果表明,在非效率定价的市场环境下,管理层为了自身利益会充分利用市场的非有效定价现象来影响公司的股利行为。Using the data of listed companies in China related to stock incentives from 2006 to 2010, this paper tests the effect of the implementation of managerial stock incentives on corporate stock dividends behavior. Based on the test of the long-term market reaction of stock dividends, it shows that the companies that implement stock incentives are more inclined to issue high stock dividends and higher stock incentives degree results in higher probability of issuing high stock dividends. Furthermore, it indicates that the effects of different types of stock incentives system on stock dividends policy vary. Therefore, the re- sults confirm that the top managers will make full use of the inefficient pricing phenomenon in the market to affect corporate stock dividends behavior in favor of their own interests.

关 键 词：股权激励 股票股利 股票期权 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]