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机构地区:[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054
出 处:《技术经济》2012年第9期114-119,共6页Journal of Technology Economics
摘 要:利用联合决策的博弈模型,针对是否存在信息泄漏,分两种情况对代工合约进行分析。结果发现:在存在信息泄漏的情况下,代工企业的"敲竹杠"行为会使品牌企业与代工企业无法建立长期、稳定的代工关系,此时品牌企业若采取"哑铃型"经营模式可能会出现经营失败。最后,从理论上阐明了建立长期、稳定的代工合约关系的条件,以及处于连续性生产行业的部分企业不能采用"哑铃型"经营模式的原因。By using the joint-decision game model, this paper analyzes the OEM contract under two cases that information leakage exists or not. The results show that the long-term stable relationship between the brand firm and the OEM firm don't form due to the rip-off behavior of the OEM firm when information leakage exists, and the dumbbell-shaped business model is not suit for the brand firm. The conclusion theoretically clarifies the condition to establish a long-term stable OEM contract relationship,and the reason why the dumbbell-shaped business mode is not suit for some firms in continuous production industry.
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