政府分权、政府竞争与发展模式的可持续性  

Governmental Decentralization,the Local Government's Competition and the Sustainability of Developmental Model:Example of China

作　　者：张为杰[1] 姜莱[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第5期56-62,共7页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社科重点研究基地项目(2010CIB01)

摘　　要：地方政府行为依赖于所面临的激励与约束机制。地方政府竞争成为我国经济增长进程中的常态,这源于我国独特的政府分权制度。在财政激励下,地方政府通过对各要素采取非均衡的产权保护方式为增长而竞争。这种竞争模式过度保护了资本要素,而忽视甚至侵害了劳动力、土地等要素。因此,地方政府竞争在促进我国经济高增长的同时,也付出了极高的代价。在缺乏公众等主体的约束下,政府分权带来激励偏差会加大,该发展模式将受到很大的挑战。The behavior of local governments depends on the mechanisms of incentive and restraint. Competition between local governments becomes the norm in the process of China＇ s economic growth, which stems from our unique system of governmental decentralization. Facing the financial in- eentivea, the local government competes for growth through non - balaneod property fights protection of the various elements. This mode of competi- tion makes the local government protect capital too much, while ignoring or even destroying the labor, land and other factors. Thus, competition between local governments promotes China＇ s economic growth, meanwhile pays a high price. In the absence of the public and other constraints, the incentive bias will increase brought by governmental decentralization, , and this mode of development will face a great challenge.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 政府分权 激励机制 发展模式 

分 类 号：F124[经济管理—世界经济]