分销渠道中的零售商合谋与防范研究  

Study on Retailer Collusion and Its Prevention in Distribution Channels

作　　者：刘军[1] 谭德庆[1] 唐毅青[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第5期8-13,共6页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：四川省科技厅科技支撑计划项目(2011SZ0228)

摘　　要：在完全分销渠道中,利用博弈模型研究包括制造商层次与零售商层次的双重竞争关系对零售商合谋定价与制造商防范均衡的影响,结果表明:只有在双重竞争较为激烈时,制造商对零售商的合谋定价采取防范措施才能使其得到更大利润;而在双重竞争程度较低时,制造商对零售商的合谋销售不能采取防范措施,否则会得到较低的利润甚至亏损。In a distribution channel comprised of two manufacturers and two retailers, game model is used to study the impact of dual competition relationships which include levels of manufacturers and retailers on the equilibrium between the collusive pricing by the retailers and prevention by the manufacturers. The results show that manufactures will take preventive measures against collusion pricing of retailers in order to make greater profits only when the dual competition is more intense. On a lower dual competition level, manufacturers will make lower profits or even suffer losses if they take preventive measures against collusive pricing of retailers. Meanwhile, it is worthwhile for the manufacturers to spend a certain amount of human and material resources and carry out information management of retailers.

关 键 词：分销渠道 双重竞争关系 制造商 零售商 合谋定价策略 防范策略 供应链管理 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]