委托—代理框架下的产业研发激励机制研究  

A Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Industrial R&D Investment in the Principal-Agent Framework

作　　者：李新运[1] 任栋[2] 唐保国[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东大学经济研究院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《山东财政学院学报》2012年第4期71-76,共6页Journal of Shandong Finance Institute

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划项目"基于委托-代理理论的政府对企业R&D支出激励模型与实证研究"(09YJA630087);山东省软科学计划项目"山东省政府科技投入对企业R&D支出的影响定量分析"(2008RKA259);"山东省科技投入产出效率分析及对策研究"(2010RKGB3023)

摘　　要：为了使有限的财政科技经费能够有效的激励企业扩大研发支出,需要对研发激励机制进行合理的设计。由于不同产业间存在禀赋上的差异,导致研发回报率差异较大,企业进行自主研发的积极性也不尽相同。在委托—代理框架下引入研发回报率作为观测因子,改进了委托—代理激励模型,求解出最优激励合同,并以山东省专业设备制造业为例进行了实证研究。结果表明引入研发回报率可以优化财政科研经费在激励企业自主研发和补偿企业研发风险上的分配关系,提高了合同的激励强度。It requires a rational design for R＆D incentive mechanism to encourage enterprises to expand R＆D spending effectively with limited government R＆D funding. Due to the differences in endowments, enterprises＇ en- thusiasm of independent research and rate of return on R＆D are inconsistent in different industries. Therefore, we introduced the rate of return on R＆D as an observation factor to the principal - agent model, improved the principal - agent incentive model, solved the optimal incentive contract, and did an empirical study on Shandong professional equipment manufacturing. The results show that the distributional relationship of government research funding be- tween R＆D risk compensation and independent research incentive can be coordinated effectively and the incentive strength of contract will be improved by introducing rate of return on R＆D as an observation factor to the principal - agent framework,

关 键 词：科技投入 委托-代理理论 激励合同 R&D 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]