上市公司董事会对权力关联CEO的监管效率研究——以CEO职位强制变更为视角  

Supervision Efficiency of the Board on CEOs with Power Connection——From the Perspective of Forced Turnover of CEOs

作　　者：庞金勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东师范大学商学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《科学．经济．社会》2012年第3期24-29,共6页Science Economy Society

基　　金：山东省社科规划重点项目(07BJGZ28)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文从具有权力关联资源CEO的强制变更角度实证研究了上市公司的董事会治理效率。通过对董事会诸多变量与CEO强制变更之间关系的回归分析发现,公司绩效与CEO的强制变更显著负相关,而董事会规模等变量与具有权力关联CEO的强制变更没有显著的相关性。实证研究结果意味着,首先更换具有权力关联资源CEO的决策是依据公司经营绩效状况作出的;其次作出CEO强制变更决策的主体可能是影响力强大的控股股东或具有政治干预能力的政府行政机构而不是董事会。这表明上市公司董事会在具有权力关系资源的CEO面前缺乏应有治理效率,实际上董事会只是某些权力主体的附庸或摆设机构而已。The paper does an empirical research on the governance efficiency of the board of directors of listed companies from the perspective of forced turnover of CEO with power associated resources.Through the regression analysis over the relationship between the forced turnover and the variables of board characteristics,the paper finds that forced turnover is negatively correlated with firm performance,but has no significant correlation with board variables.The empirical results imply that,firstly the decision of replacing the CEO associated with powers resources is made according to the performance status;secondly the decision may be made by the powerful objects such as the controlling shareholders or the government administrator with political capacity to intervene institutions rather than the board of directors.This indicates that the board of directors of listed companies in the face of the CEO with the power relations resources lack of proper governance efficiency,in fact the board of directors is the vassal of some of the actual power to the main or furnishings only.

关 键 词：CEO权力关联 强制变更 董事会 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]