我国股权激励经济后果的实证检验  

The empirical examination of economical consequence of stock option in China

作　　者：陈艳艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《南方经济》2012年第10期123-134,共12页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532003)资助

摘　　要：本文研究股权激励的经济后果,包括是否提升经营业绩,业绩提升是否源于盈余管理与业绩提升的影响因素三个方面。首先,对于某一年度的净资产收益率、净利润增长率与营业收入利润率,股权激励具有提升作用,但不具有持续性,甚至会出现反转。在实施当年到后四年的时间内,实施公司上述指标的平均表现也与配对公司无显著差异。换言之,股权激励无法有效提升公司经营业绩。其次,实施公司的操控性应计与经营业绩变化存在正相关关系;在剔除操控性应计后,股权激励的短暂提升作用消失,实施公司与配对公司无显著性差异。最后,当方案设计受到管理层操纵时,对实施公司的经营业绩产生负面影响。The paper investigates the economical consequence of stock option, including whether improve firm performance, whether the improvement stems from earning management, and the determinants of performance improvement. The result shows that stock option could improve performance in some specific year, but the improvement in not persistent. For the period from T year to T ~ 4 year, the average performance of adopting f＇Lrrns is indifferent from the matching firms. Moreover, the discretionary accrual of adopting finns is positively related to their performance. By excluding discretionary accrual, the temporary improvement disappears. Lastly, the manipulation on scheme design from the managers has negative effect on firm performance.

关 键 词：最优契约 管理层权力 经营业绩 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]