我国家族企业委托代理风险防范的博弈分析  

Analysis of Risk of Agency by Agreement of Family Firms with Game Theory

作　　者：高武[1,2] 罗宇岑[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南城市学院城市管理学院,湖南益阳413000 [2]中南大学商学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《湖南城市学院学报》2012年第4期58-61,共4页Journal of Hunan City Univeristy

基　　金：湖南省教育厅青年项目立项资助课题(11B022);湖南城市学院校级课题(2007)

摘　　要：我国家族企业委托代理风险的形成是外部市场制度不完善、公司内部治理机制不科学与信息不对称共同作用的结果。在重复博弈中,委托代理双方因此可能陷入非合作博弈困境,最终双方利益受损,企业发展受阻。为防范委托代理风险和从制度上确保互动公平,应从薪酬、声誉等多方面合理设计职业经理人的激励约束机制,确保代理人目标收益在诚信和努力工作的情况下最大,从而确保其自觉地为股东利益服务,最终实现双方利益的帕累托改进。Risk of agency by agreement leads a non-cooperation between the owner and professional manager of family firms in China. Both sides＇ interests will be harmed under this condition. More than that, management level and development of the family company will be blocked too. To avoid this situation occur and control the risk effectively, the family firms should make a rational mechanism to encourage and restrict the professional managers, making their anticipative income to be biggest under the case of working hard for the owner and being honest. Only under this condition, can we make sure the mangers to serve for the owner with self- consciousness and the both sides＇ interest that can be improved at the same time.

关 键 词：家族企业 委托代理 博弈均衡 风险防范 激励相容 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济]