马塞尔哲学中的实存和身体概念  

The Concepts of Existence and Body in G.Marcel

作　　者：杨大春[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学哲学系,杭州310028

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2012年第6期12-17,共6页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"现象学在二十世纪法国哲学中的主导地位研究"(08BZX047)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：马塞尔哲学强调实存对于知性的优先性,它被归属于神秘而不是问题之列。受法国精神论传统和柏格森生命哲学的影响,马塞尔赋予了精神或意识新的含义。精神就是直接意识,这意味着个体经验的直接性,意味着本己身体的中心地位;人的实存就是精神或意识的独一无二的体验,因而围绕本己身体展开的实存关系是最基础的关系。心身关系问题是观念论传统的产物,它在实存哲学中呈现出完全不同的意义,它只不过是精神活动的派生形式。Marcers philosophy stresses that the existential entity is given priority instead of intellectuality, with the former being in the category of mysteries rather than issues. Influenced by the tradition of French Spiritualism and the life philosophy of Bergson, Marcel gave new meaning to spirit or consciousness. The spirit is a direct consciousness, which means the directness of individual experience, the central position of one＇s own body. Human existence is then a unique ex- perience of spirit or consciousness, and thus the existential relationship surrounding one＇s own body becomes the most fun- damental relationship. The psychosomatic relationship is the result of coneeptualism traditional, which presents a complete- ly different meaning in the existential philosophy： it is nothing but the derivative form of mental activities.

关 键 词：实存 身体 知性 精神 心灵 

分 类 号：B516.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]