不确定响应时间下准时交货激励契约的协同研究  

The Collaboration Model and Algorithm of Just-in-time Delivery Incentive Contracts Based on Response Time Uncertainty

作　　者：方忠民[1] 陈治亚[1] 曾明华[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学交通运输工程学院,湖南长沙410075 [2]华东交通大学轨道交通学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《华东交通大学学报》2012年第5期88-93,共6页Journal of East China Jiaotong University

基　　金：湖南省哲学社会科学基金项目(2010YBB246);湖南省自然科学基金项目(09JJ3135);江西省教育厅科技计划项目(GJJ12322)

摘　　要：在供应链战略合作伙伴关系的体系框架下,以博弈论作为分析工具,针对采购双方动态交互决策过程建立了以供应链中核心生产企业为主方,供应商为从方的Stackelberg博弈模型。基于最优性分析讨论了准时采购过程中双方决策的交互影响关系,在无约束条件下分析Stackelberg均衡解的必要条件。最后提出了该博弈模型的内嵌内点法的模拟退火算法。In the strategic collaborative partnership framework of supply chain,with game theory as the analysis tool,based on the dynamic interactive decision-making process of both parties,we establish the Stackelberg game model,in which the manufacturer is the main part,and the supplier is the minor one.Through the post-optimality analysis,we discuss the decision interaction relationship in the just-in-time purchasing process and explore essential requirements for Stackelberg equilibrium solution under unconfined conditions.Finally,we raise the simulated annealing algorithm of embedding interior point method for this game model.

关 键 词：协同 STACKELBERG博弈 不确定响应时间 激励契约 模拟退火算法 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F252[经济管理—国民经济]