基于进化博弈论的食品质量安全监管分析  

Analysis on Food Quality and Safety Supervision Based on Evolutional Game Theory

作　　者：李宗泰[1] 何忠伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京农学院经济管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《中国农学通报》2012年第30期312-316,共5页Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin

基　　金：北京哲学社科规划重点项目"基于供应链的北京农产品质量安全管理模式研究"(09AbJG296)

摘　　要：运用进化博弈理论探寻食品质量安全监管问题的治理对策。通过构建食品质量安全演化博弈模型,分析食品生产经营者和监管者的策略空间以及演化趋势,得出了食品质量安全监管的演化相图以及在每一个平衡点的演化稳定特性,据此发现博弈两方的策略演化的方向以及可能性与策略的预期收益紧密相关。为了得到更多的安全食品,应该通过补贴、奖励等政策提升遵纪守法行为的预期收益,通过罚款、惩处等政策降低违纪非法行为的预期收益。Based on evolutionary game theory, the paper supervision and its relative solutions. By constructing food discusses the issue of food quality and safety quality and safety supervision evolutionary game theory model, it analyzes the possible strategies and evolutionary trend of food producers, traders and supervisors. It further derives the evolutionary diagram of food quality and safety supervision and the evolutionary stability of each equilibrium point, and concludes that the evolutionary trend and possibility of each party is closely related to the expected return of the strategies they take. In order to improve food quality and safety, the supervisor should improve the expected return of disciplined behaviors by subsidiaries and awards, while lowering the expected return of undisciplined behaviors by penalties and punishments.

关 键 词：食品质量安全 监管 进化博弈理论 

分 类 号：F304.3[经济管理—产业经济]