意识现象、所予性与本质直观——对胡塞尔现象学的有关质疑  

The Phenomenon of Consciousness,Givenness and the Intuition of Essence:Suspicion about Husserl's Phenomenology

作　　者：陈嘉明[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系

出　　处：《中国社会科学》2012年第11期42-56,204,共15页Social Sciences in China

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"‘元哲学’研究"(批准号10BZX047);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"先验与经验--知识论的基础问题研究"(批准号09YJA720017)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：胡塞尔现象学的心理学把现象定位于"纯粹意识"。它以"契合性"作为感知的标准来论证把握心理现象的可靠性。隐性的心理现象能否被我们"契合地"感知,是否具有"绝对的所予性"与"明证性",值得商榷。与基础主义类似,胡塞尔求助于一种直观的直接所予。对意识现象而言,概念因素的介入否定了感觉内容与感知对象之间的直接同一性。如此一来,胡塞尔所要确立的感知的"契合性"标准便难以成立,与之相关联的"绝对性"和"明证性"的证明亦复如是。胡塞尔的本质直观理论是以亚里士多德式的"类"的本质观为依据的,他把本质视为一种直接性,没有认识到本质的间接性。此外,假如直观是一种不同于传统内省的方法,那么能否以及如何在它们之间划出一条明确的界限?Husserl's phenomenological psychology posits phenomena as'pure consciousness.'It uses'adequation'as a criterion of perception to argue for and understand the reliability of mental phenomena.It is doubtful whether covert mental phenomena can be perceived by us via'adequation',and whether they have'absolute givenness'and 'self-evidence.'Similar to Foundationalists,Husserl resorts to a kind of direct intuitive givenness.For the phenomenon of consciousness,the intervention of conceptual elements negates the direct homogeneity between the content of perception and the object of perception.As such,the'adequation'criterion as identified by Husserl can hardly hold water,so are the'absoluteness'and'self-evidence'related to it.Husserl's theory of intuition of essence is based on Aristotle's'generic'view of essence,but he fails to see the indirectness of essence and deems essence as a direct one.Furthermore,if intuition as a method is different from traditional introspection,is it possible to draw a demarcation line between them?If so,how?

关 键 词：现象学 意识现象 所予性 本质直观 

分 类 号：B516.52[哲学宗教—外国哲学]