农超对接模式中的合作博弈问题研究  被引量:55

A Cooperative Game in the Model of Connecting Agriculture with Supermarkets

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作  者:刘磊[1] 乔忠[1] 刘畅[1] 

机构地区:[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出  处:《管理工程学报》2012年第4期100-106,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基  金:国家"十一五"科技支撑计划课题基金资助项目(2006BAJ07B02);中国农业大学研究生科研创新专项基金资助项目(15059210)

摘  要:本文在需求函数中引入"合作社为提高每单位农产品质量而付出的努力成本"这一变量,利用非合作博弈中的Buyer-Stackelberg模型、Seller-Stackelberg模型和合作博弈模型对比研究了农超对接模式下超市与合作社在竞争、合作时农产品质量安全水平、零售价格和市场需求量的差异,得出了合作博弈模式能够提高农产品质量安全水平,降低农产品零售价格,并扩大农产品市场需求量三个结论。最后,本文的算例结果显示,农超对接的合作博弈不仅能实现以上结论,还能够提高整个供应链的利润。对关键参数进行灵敏度分析发现,当消费者对农产品零售价格越不敏感而越关注农产品质量安全时,合作博弈的解就越优于非合作博弈。With the constant change in the circulation of agricultural products in China, more and more supermarkets begin to connect with farms directly in order to stay competitive. This mode can reduce the number of circulation stages of fresh agricultural products, and mitigate the difficulty in selling agricultural products. In addition, the mode can provide the market with high-quality agricultural products. Future study may want to investigate how competitive and cooperative behaviors between supermarkets and co-ops will affect the overall profit of the supply chain, retail price, market demand and the quality of agricultural products. This paper assumes that one supermarket and one co-op form in a two-level supply chain. Vegetables are used as an example and profit function is used as the basic model. The variable "effort" is provided by co-op in order to improve the quality of agricultural products. We compare the optimal decisions of both sides using Stackelberg and Cooperative games. In the first part of this paper, we assume that the consumption of vegetables is indefinite and is a multiplication function of retail price and effort provided by co-op in order to improve the quality of agricultural products. According to the demand function, we can obtain the optimal value of decision variables by using retail price as the decision variable of supermarket, and the wholesale price and effort as co-op's decision variables. The second part discusses the relationship between supermarket and co-op using the Buyer- Stackelberg game, the Seller-Stackelberg game and the Cooperative game. By solving the optimal decisions of co-op and supermarket in these three models, we summarize three propositions. Cooperative game receives the lowest price, the highest quality of products and the largest market demand among the three models. Finally, this paper verifies the correctness of the conclusions discussed above by three examples. In addition, cooperative game can maximize the overall profit of the supply chain. In the

关 键 词:农超对接 合作与非合作博弈 质量安全 零售价格 市场需求 

分 类 号:F273[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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