博弈论视角下员工进谏行为分析及机制构建  

The Analysis of Employee Voice Based on the Game Theory

作　　者：王丽平[1] 陈颖[1] 刘祯祺[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384 [2]厦门大学经济学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《预测》2012年第6期7-12,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BGL029);天津市科技发展战略规划项目(11ZLZLZT02000);天津市普通高等学校本科教学质量与教学改革研究项目(2012-43)

摘　　要：进谏行为作为一种角色外行为日益成为企业发展与变革的推动力,在提高员工的组织公平感,提升组织效能等方面发挥着重要作用。本文从博弈论视角出发,建立了企业与员工的一次动态博弈模型,引入无限次重复博弈模型分析进谏过程中双方的策略选择。结论认为通过灵活激励手段、丰富进谏渠道、培育进谏氛围等进谏机制,可以激发员工的进谏行为,实现企业与员工双赢发展。As one of extra-role behaviors, voice behavior increasingly becoming an impulsive force for the development and reform of the enterprises, which plays an important role in improving the employees ＇ organizational justice and increasing organizational efficacy. In this paper, based on the game theory , one-time dynamic game model and infinitely repeated games model between the employer and employee are built to analyze the selecting strategy of them in the progress of voice behavior. It comes to an inclusion that through the voicing mechanisms of flexibling the application on means to encourage employees, being rich in the channel of voice behavior and cultivating the voice atmosphere, the employer and employee can achieve double win.

关 键 词：进谏行为 动态博弈 进谏机制 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]