产品市场纵向差异的两阶段再制造供应链契约协调  

Coordination of Two-stage Contract for Remanufacturing Supply Chain with Vertical Production Differentiation

作　　者：李琰[1,2] 达庆利[1] 孙浩[3] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096 [2]南京信息工程大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210044 [3]青岛大学国际商学院管理科学与工程系,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2012年第6期52-60,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772059;71202142)

摘　　要：针对常规产品与再制品销售市场的纵向差异和常规材料价格随机波动的情况,建立了"制造商—回收商"Stackelberg博弈模型,设计了考虑常规材料价格信息更新的两阶段回收费用共担再制造供应链契约协调机制,证明了两阶段可变契约的效益高于单阶段固定契约。算例分析表明两阶段可变契约的有效性:常规材料价格随机波动幅度越大,两阶段契约的改善程度越高;且协调机制能夠鼓励废旧产品的再制造,实现经济效益与社会效益的双赢。Based on the vertical differentiation between normal and remanufactured products in marketing and considering normal materials＇ stochastic price, the ＂manufacturer-retailer＂ Stackelberg models are es- tablished. With normal materials＇ price information updating, the coordiantion mechanism of two-stage re- trieving-expense-sharing contract of remanufacturing supply chain is designed. It is proved that the two- stage adjustable contract is more efficient than the one-stage fixed contract. The effectiveness of the two- stage adjustable contract is then shown by means of the numerical analysis： the wider the fluctuating range of normal materials＇ price, the more efficient the contract works; the coordinating mechanism in the paper can promote remanufacturing and achieve a win-win goal of both economic and social benefits.

关 键 词：可变契约 纵向差异 常规材料价格随机 再制造 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]