公司治理与高管政治联系的“双刃剑”效应  

Double-edged Sword Effect of Political Connections between Corporate Governance and Senior Managers

作　　者：郭剑花[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东商学院会计学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2013年第1期92-100,共9页Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(09CJY087);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJC630051;11YJC790076;11YJA630026);广东省自然科学基金博士启动项目(S2011040004548);广东高校优秀青年创新人才培养计划项目(WYM11062)

摘　　要：高管政治联系具有"双刃剑"效应——"政府干预"作用与"关系"作用。本文从公司内部治理机制出发,考察公司治理对高管政治联系"双刃剑"效应的激励与约束作用。研究表明,公司治理质量越高,高管政治联系的"政府干预"作用越弱,"关系"作用越强。本文揭示了高管政治联系在政企关系中的"桥梁"角色,并提供了公司治理缓解高管与企业代理冲突的增量证据,有助于企业扬长避短、最优化政治联系的"双刃剑"效应。Political connections of managers have the double- edged sword effect, i. e. ＂government intervention＂ and ＂guanxi＂ . This paper examines the influence of inner corporate governance mechanisms on the double- edged sword effect of political connections. It is found that the better corporate governance mechanisms, the weaker the government intervention effect and the stronger the guanxi effect. Our research reveals the bridge role of politically connected managers in the relation between the government and enterprises, and also provides the empirical evidence of corporate governance on the solving the agency conflict, which is helpful for enterprises to better take the effects of political connections.

关 键 词：公司治理 政治联系 双刃剑 政府干预 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]