政治晋升激励可持续吗  

Is Political Promotion Incentive in China Sustainable

作　　者：李红梅[1] 李琦[2] 

机构地区：[1]盐城工学院大学外语部,江苏盐城224051 [2]盐城工学院经管学院,江苏盐城224051

出　　处：《盐城工学院学报（社会科学版）》2012年第4期9-13,共5页Journal of Yancheng Institute of Technology（Social Science Edition）

基　　金：江苏省社会科学基金项目(10EYB005)

摘　　要：政治晋升激励在推动中国经济增长中发挥了重要作用,但由于地区异质性、外部冲击和统计质量问题,激励机制面临着较高的绩效噪声,收益递增、锦标赛激励效应传递放大机制和政治组织内生于委托人自身行动的任务特点进一步增强了绩效噪声,进而产生激励成本增加、激励效率损失、激励扭曲加大、宏观决策困难和特定情况下"激励失灵"问题,其可持续性正在下降。改革激励机制并最终让市场激励机制发挥作用,是中国未来改革的方向。We find that there are several sources of performance noise, including regional heterogeneity, external impact, and sta- tistical quality. We also find that there are several strengthening mechanisms of performance noise, and several strategic actions for promotion among governments in a high performance noise environment, which brought about serious problems, including more incentive costs, higher loss of efficiency and incentive distortion, more difficulty in macro decision - making, and incentives failure in particular circumstances. These problems above are influenced the sustainability of political promotion tournament in China. So to reform the incentive system and bring the market, which is a fundamental incentive mechanism, into play, is the path to future reform.

关 键 词：晋升锦标赛 可持续性 绩效噪声 晋升博弈 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]