刍议滥用股东派生诉讼权利之规制  

Analysis on the Regulation of the Abuse of Shareholder Derivative Action

作　　者：陈月棋 刘莺 

机构地区：[1]浙江腾飞金鹰律师事务所,浙江杭州310012

出　　处：《河北法学》2013年第2期191-200,共10页Hebei Law Science

摘　　要：作为平衡普通法所坚持的适当原告、资本多数决原则的例外规则发展而产生的股东派生诉讼逐步发展为一项成文法制度并为各国所移植和借鉴,但是这一制度却因其滥诉的大量存在而越来越多地遭到质疑和诟病。从股东派生诉讼的源起出发,客观列举以滥诉为核心的这一制度所存在的弊端,归纳和总结滥诉的原因。然后从股东派生诉讼制度产生的原因入手,剖析规制滥诉的理论基础,并结合我国公司法有关股东派生诉讼的立法现状以及英美、大陆法系主要国家已有的规制滥诉的制度安排,就如何在中国现有的立法和司法环境下规制滥用股东派生诉讼权利提出制度设计建议。Shareholder derivative action, derived as an exception to balance the proper plaintiff principle and the majority rule principle, has developed and been codified and then transplanted world widely. However, this institution has been challenged and questioned recently due to the abuse of right of action. This article begins with the very origin of this kind of action and introduces the disadvantages, then analyzes the reasons. Upon the origin and the legal base of regulation of abuse of right of action, together with comparison of the laws and regulations in China today and US, UK ,Japan and Germany, this article put forwards suggestions to promote the Shareholder derivative action in China under the given Legislation and legal practice.

关 键 词：股东派生诉讼 滥诉 规制 

分 类 号：DF72[政治法律—诉讼法学]