捆绑披露是隐藏坏消息吗——来自独立董事辞职公告的证据  

Is Bundled Disclosure to Hide the Bad News?——Evidence from Independent Director Resignation Announcement Data

作　　者：吴冬梅[1] 刘运国[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院/中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心,510275

出　　处：《会计研究》2012年第12期19-25,94,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：广东省科技计划项目-社会发展引导项目(批准号:2008B080703025);广东省文科基地重大项目(批准号:10JDXM79001);教育部人文社科一般项目(批准号:11YJA790094);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(批准号:1109153;11nkjl04);国家自然科学基金重点项目(批准号:71032006)的支持

摘　　要：本文利用2003-2010年中国上市公司独立董事辞职公告数据,考察了我国特有的捆绑披露现象。结果发现,多数独董辞职信息与其他信息捆绑在一起披露,并未单独成文披露。本文按辞职人数和原因对信息分类,研究发现,相对于"单人"和"规定"辞职,"多人"和"非规定"辞职更多采用捆绑披露。进一步按辞职原因细分"非规定"辞职,研究还发现,相对于"可疑"辞职,"尤其可疑"辞职更多采用捆绑披露。上述结果表明捆绑披露是隐藏坏消息的非随机行为,管理层会基于信息性质进行披露形式的裁量,这丰富了我们对强制披露自由裁量的认识。We use Chinese listed companies' independent director resignation announcement data in 2003-2010 to examine Chinese unique bundled disclosure phenomenon. We find that the majority of independent directors resign information is usually bundled with other information when disclosing, rather as a separate written disclosure. We use the number and the reasons of resignation to classify information in the announcement, and find that relative to the resignation of the 'single' and 'prescribed'resignation, 'multiple' and 'non-prescriptive' resignation is more often used in bundled disclosure. Further subdividing 'non-prescriptive' resignation by reasons, we also find that relative to the 'suspicious'resignation, 'especially suspicious' resignation is more often used in bundled disclosure. This indicates that the bundled disclosure is non-random behavior to hide bad news and management layer will choose form of disclosure basing on the property of the information, which enriches our understanding of the mandatory disclosure of discretion.

关 键 词：强制披露形式裁量捆绑披露信息性质 坏消息 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]