基于控制权的异常派现与非理性投资的相机抉择  

Discretion Based on Abnormal Dividend of Control Right and Irrational Investment

作　　者：刘孟晖[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《系统工程》2012年第11期43-47,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目(12YJA630074);河南省教育厅人文社科研究项目(2011-QN-060)

摘　　要：公司控制人在进行税后利润分配时,需要在现金股利和投资之间进行相机抉择。本文在理论分析框架的基础上,建立了相关分析模型,对异常派现与非理性投资之间的关系进行了论证。结果表明,公司控制人目标与公司目标具有不完全一致性,公司股权相对集中有利于规范公司控制人行为,但股权的过分集中会激励公司控制人利用外部融资进行异常高派现或过度投资。In after-tax profit distribution, the controlling shareholders of the company must have the discretion between dividend and investment. On the basis of theoretical analysis framework, the paper establishes the relevant analysis model, which demonstrates the relationship between abnormal dividend and irrational investment. The result shows that the controlling shareholders target and company target is incompletely consistent. Relative concentrated equity is useful for constraining the behavior of controlling shareholders of the company,but excessive concentrated equity can encourage the controlling shareholders of the company to have abnormal high dividend and overinvestment using the external financing.

关 键 词：控制权 异常派现 非理性投资 相机抉择 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]