高管层权力、股权薪酬差距与企业绩效研究——基于《上市公司股权激励管理办法》实施后的面板数据  

Managerial Power,Stock Compensation Gap and Stock Incentive Performance: An Analysis Based on the Unbalanced Panel Data of Chinese Listed Companies after the Implementation of "Management Methods"

作　　者：龚永洪[1] 何凡[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川师范大学数学与软件科学学院,四川成都610068

出　　处：《南京农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第1期113-120,共8页Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：四川省教育厅重点项目(11SA053)

摘　　要：使用2006年《上市公司股权激励管理办法》实施以来,首次宣布实施股权激励计划的上市公司2006—2010年的非平衡面板数据,以企业绩效水平和企业绩效波动性为切入点,实证研究高管层权力、股权薪酬差距与企业绩效之间的关系。研究发现:(1)高管层权力增大会显著加大股权薪酬水平和股权薪酬差距;(2)高管层权力对提升企业绩效水平有显著的正面效应,但同时也加大了企业绩效的波动性;(3)股权薪酬差距与企业绩效水平及波动性之间存在显著的正相关关系;(4)从高管层权力和股权薪酬差距的综合效应看,两者在提升股权激励绩效水平的同时显著地加大了企业绩效波动性。This paper released for the first time the unbalanced panel data between 2006 and 2010 of listed com- panies implementing stock incentive plans after the implementation of 2006＇ s ＂Stock Incentive Management Methods for Listed Companies＂, and empirically studied the relationship between high managerial power, the stock compensation gap and the stock incentive performance with the use of enterprise performance level and its fluctuation as starting points. The research findings were： （1）high managerial power increases stock compensa- tion level and gap; （2）high managerial power is positively related to enterprise performance level and increases its fluctuation; （3）the stock compensation gap and enterprise performance level and its fluctuation are positively related; （4）judging from the composite effect of high managerial power and stock compensation gap, the two sig- nificantly increase the enterprise performance fluctuation as well as elevate the stock incentive performance level. Based on the above findings, the paper made an analysis on the conclusions and their limitations and put forward some suggestions.

关 键 词：高管层权力 股权薪酬差距 企业绩效水平 企业绩效波动性 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]