加拿大并购反垄断审查中的效率因素分析——以Hillsdown Holdings并购案为例  

An Analysis on Efficiency Factors in Canadian Merger Antitrust Review: Give the Hillsdown Holdings Case as an Example

作　　者：余东华[1] 刘晓燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院

出　　处：《世界经济研究》2013年第2期68-73,89,共6页World Economy Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"横向并购反垄断控制中的效率抗辩研究"(批准号:11FJL013);教育部人文社会科学项目"经营者集中的反垄断控制:理论模型;量化标准与安全港规则研究"(批准号:10YJC790351);山东大学自主创新基金人文社科青年学术团队项目"转型期中国反垄断问题研究"的资助

摘　　要：加拿大反垄断当局对并购进行反垄断控制的法律依据是《竞争法》和《并购实施指南》,其并购反垄断控制政策要求并购可能带来的效率在加拿大境内实现的部分能够补偿该项并购给加拿大生产者和消费者带来的福利净损失,并对能够纳入反垄断当局评估分析的效率因素进行详细界定。由于效率难以观察和证实,在早期的司法实践中,效率因素对于竞争管理局的并购评估审查判定影响有限。20世纪90年代以后,加拿大反垄断当局对于效率的态度逐步趋于友好,效率因素对于反垄断当局最终判定的影响越来越大。The legal bases for anti-monopoly control of mergers for Canadian antitrust authorities are Competition Law and Guideline of Merger Control.The policies of merger antitrust control requirements that efficiency brought by mergers in Canada can be able to compensate for the welfare net loss of Canadian producers and consumers,and define the efficiency factors in detail that can be incorporated into assessment and analysis on the antitrust authorities.Since efficiency is difficult to observe and confirmed,it has limited impacts on the competition authority′s determination of merger assessment review in early judicial practice.After 1990s,the attitudes of the Canadian antitrust authorities on efficiency become friendly.The efficiency factors play a more and more important role in the antitrust authorities′ final determination.

关 键 词：效率因素 并购反垄断控制 加拿大 Hillsdown Holdings并购案 

分 类 号：D971.1[政治法律—法学] DD912.29[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]