寡头行业R&D投资决策的两阶段动态博弈分析  

Analyses on Two-Stage Dynamic Game of R&D Investment Decision in Oligopoly Industry

作　　者：赵帅[1] 杨建飞[1] 孔凡亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710127

出　　处：《西安石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第1期37-42,88,共7页Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072160)

摘　　要：在研究寡头垄断行业从古诺模型阶段到斯塔克博格模型阶段竞争企业的研发方式、最优技术含量、R&D投资量的关系及其变化的基础上,计算出在这两种模型下的Nash均衡点、企业利润、最优技术含量和R&D投资量,并通过两个模型的对比分析发现,领导型企业的R&D投资量最高,从而说明了在一定程度上市场集中度的提高可以促进行业的技术进步。Based on the research about the development way of competitive enterprises in oligopoly indus- try during the evolution from ancient Connaught model stage to Stackelberg model stage, the best technical con- tent,the relationship and changes of R＆D investment amount, the following items in the two kinds of models are calculated, including the Nash equilibrium point, profits of enterprises, the content of optimized technology, the amount of R＆D investment. Then it is found out from the contrastive analysis of two models that leading companies have the highest amount in the R＆D investment, and that the improvement of market concentration degree can promote the technical progress of industry to some extent.

关 键 词：寡头行业 R&D NASH均衡 古诺模型 斯塔克博格模型 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]