苏轼与程颐在性情论上的分歧  

Differences between Sushi and Chengyi in Humanism Status and Action

作　　者：胡金旺[1] 

机构地区：[1]宜宾学院,宜宾644000

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》2012年第6期63-67,共5页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：2010年度四川省教育厅社会科学科研基地项目"苏轼与王安石哲学思想比较研究"(10ZX007)

摘　　要：苏轼的性情关系论是其道论在人性论上的必然表现。苏轼认为道在现实界是以生生之易的形式呈现出来,所以只有通过易才能体认到隐藏于其中的道。道与易的关系在人性论上对应于性与情的关系。与道在易中相一致,性在情中,因此只有将情流露得自然而然以至不自知时才能真正彰显人性、体现人性。而程颐是用性的道德理性来规范情,对情进行约束与抑制,因而其情就表现为抑制性与道德理性主义的特点,而忽视了人的情感多方面的需要与价值。Sushi thought the relation between xing and qing was consistent with that between Tao and Changs. Tao is in Changs. We only experience Tao through Changs. Xing and Tao are in the same level. Qing is a kind of special appeared form of Changs. So xing is in qing. We only experience xing by expressing qing appropriate and unconscious. And Chengyi regulated qing with morality of xing, and constrainted and inhibited it. So qing is represented inhibitory and moral rationalist characteristics, ignoring the various needs and value in the human emotion.

关 键 词：苏轼 程颐 性情论 性 情 

分 类 号：I209[文学—中国文学]