部分合谋市场上横向兼并的协调效应——基于Cournot模型的分析  

The Coordinated Effect of Horizontal Merger in Partial Collusion Market: Based on Cournot Model

作　　者：张曦[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学东北亚服务外包研究中心,哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第1期42-47,共6页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

基　　金：中国博士后基金面上项目(2011M500644);国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CJY049)

摘　　要：标准合谋理论认为横向兼并有助于合谋,然而,基于古诺模型的分析却表明:在成本对称的部分合谋市场上,如果横向兼并不能产生协同效应或不能给兼并厂商带来效率改进,无论是参与合谋的厂商还是边缘竞争厂商,都基本上不具备兼并的动机。它们只有在满足特定条件时才会有动力发起兼并,但这种兼并不利于默契合谋的维持,因为它提高了胡萝卜加大棒策略下维持联合利润最大化的默契合谋所必需的最小临界贴现值。According to the standard collusion theory or oligopoly game, horizontal merger will facilitate collusion. Unfortunately, we have made a very different condusion： neither the collusion firms nor the fringe firms have incentive to merger in partial collusion market ff they cannot gain efficiency improvement from merger. Even they have the incentive, the merger will make the tacit collusion more difficult to sustain because the critical minimal discounted value which is required to maintain the joint maximization profits under carrot - and - stick strategy will be enhanced.

关 键 词：部分合谋 横向兼并 协调效应 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]