零售商价格竞争下的最优决策与收益共享契约  

Optimal decisions and revenue sharing contract in supply chain with competing retailers

作　　者：刘玉霜[1,2] 张纪会[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛大学复杂性科学研究所,山东青岛266071 [2]青岛科技大学数理学院,山东青岛266061

出　　处：《控制与决策》2013年第2期269-273,278,共6页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70671057);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2010GM006)

摘　　要：研究由一个制造商与两个竞争零售商组成的两级供应链系统的最优决策及契约协调问题,其中每个零售商面临的需求是价格敏感和随机的.当随机需求分布具有递增失败率(IFR)时,竞争的零售商存在唯一最优的定价和订购决策,并给出了最优决策的解析表达式,证明了收益共享契约能使两个竞争零售商加盟的供应链达到协调及契约成立的条件.最后通过理论推导和数值分析给出了需求价格弹性系数对最优决策及协调的影响.For a two-echelon supply chain system formed by one manufacturer and two competing retailers,and the demand for the product at each retailer during a single selling season is regarded as price-dependent and stochastic,the problems about the optimal pricing and ordering decisions and the coordination of supply chain are researched.If the demand distribution satisfies the increasing failure rate（IFR） property,the existence and uniqueness of the retailer’s optimal pricing and ordering decisions are proved.It is also proved that supply chain can be coordinated by revenue sharing contract.Finally,the influence of price elasticity of demand to the optimal decisions and coordination is investigated by the theoretical and numerical analysis.

关 键 词：竞争零售商 最优定价订购决策 收益共享契约 协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]